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This study analyses article 26 (3) on the death penalty in the Kenyan 2010 constitution. The 
Kenyan judiciary continues to sentence convicts to death based on the formulation of the right 
to life in article 26(3) of the constitution and the death penalty provisions in the penal code. 
However, the rare occurrence of actual execution has made many view Kenya as a de facto 
abolitionist state. Moreover, the death penalty though codified is applied only through 
sentencing and not execution. Using the theories of contextualism, constitutionalism and 
human rights, this study examines the extent to which the death penalty complies with the 
constitution, particularly the bill of rights. Through qualitative analysis of case law and 
secondary sources, the study found that Kenya’s de facto abolitionist status allows for 
violations of constitutional provisions on the right to life, human dignity, access to justice and 
freedom and security of the person. This study concludes on the extent to which the death 
penalty is antithetical to the constitution. To harmonize the penal code with the constitution 
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1.0 Chapter One: Introduction to the research 
1.1 Background of the problem  
The question of the death penalty in Kenya has always been an emotive subject. It was provided 
for under article 71 of the 1963 constitution which stated: “no person shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence 
under the law of Kenya of which he has been convicted.”1 Article 26 of the 2010 constitution 
which substituted article 71 states “a person shall not be deprived of life intentionally, except 
to the extent authorised by this Constitution or other written law.”2 
This exclusion of the express provision for the death penalty creates legal uncertainty absent 
in the 1963 constitution. The Kenyan penal code provides the death penalty for capital offences. 
If Kenyan courts continue to sentence convicts to death it is because of the penal code. In fact, 
about four thousand criminals have been sentenced to death but the last execution was carried 
out in 19873. This situation explains why Kenya is considered, in international death penalty 
databases such as that of Amnesty International, a de facto abolitionist country4.   
When read textually article 26 (3) apparently legitimises the death penalty in line with the Penal 
Code. However, that it leaves room for the death penalty seems to contradict the progressive 
Bill of Rights within the constitution.  
Kenyan case law proves that practically, the facilitation of the death penalty results in 
constitutional violations. On this merit the study will consider the case of Francis Karioko 
Muruatetu and another v Republic (Muruatetu) in which the Supreme Court declared the 
mandatory nature of death sentencing under section 204 of the Penal Code unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court found that section 204 of the Penal Code prevented the courts from 
considering mitigating circumstances for purposes of sentencing5. This violated the right to fair 
                                                          
1 Article 71, Constitution of Kenya (1963). 
2 Article 26(3), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
3 ‘Abolition of the death penalty in Kenya’ Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Position paper N0 2, 
2007, 3- http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/CivilAndPoliticalReports/PP2%20-
%20Abolition%20of%20the%20death%20penalty%20-%20final.pdf on 28 February 2018. 
4 - https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/kenya/ on 28 February 2018.  
5 (2017) eKLR.  
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trial, the right to equality and freedom from discrimination. The Muruatetu case is significant 
for this study because of the method of judicial interpretation used by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of the death penalty because it was not an 
issue arising from the case.6 
Death row convicts in Kenya are not given specific execution dates but serve an indefinite 
prison term. This death row phenomenon has been found to violate human rights by being cruel 
and inhumane treatment7. This can be resolved by harmonizing the provisions of the Penal 
Code with the Constitution and its values. Such harmonization could be achieved by 
amendment of the Penal Code.  
Muruatetu has reignited the debate on whether Kenya should completely abolish the death 
penalty. This study’s question goes beyond the central point of the debate: can the Penal Code 
provisions on the death penalty be qualified as unconstitutional in light of the ambiguity of 
article 26 (3) on one hand and on the other hand can Kenya afford to have a penal code that is 
in contradiction with the Bill of Rights in the 2010 constitution.  
1.2 Statement of the problem  
The ambiguity of article 26 (3) gives room for diverging interpretations on the constitutionality 
of the death penalty which creates the need for legal harmonization between the constitution 
and the penal code. 
Since Kenya is a de facto abolitionist state and the death penalty is antithetical to the 
constitution, steps should be taken to: stop the interpretation of article 26(3) as prescribing the 
death penalty and; expressly delegitimize the death penalty within Kenyan laws.   
1.3 Purpose of the study 
The study purposes to make a case for the complete abolition of the death penalty by building 
upon the rationale used in Muruatetu when outlawing section 204 of the Penal Code to prove 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional. 
                                                          
6 Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic (2017) eKLR, para. 26. 




The courts derive the authority to dispense the death penalty solely from the Penal Code’s 
express provisions, legitimised by a textual interpretation of article 26(3).   
The assumption made from the onset of this study is that the progressive nature of the 
constitution does not allow for a state-imposed limitation on the right to life along the vein of 
a death penalty. 
1.5 Research questions 
Given that Kenya is considered a de facto abolitionist state, the research will seek to discuss 
the following questions; 
1. To what extent does article 26 (3) ambiguity open the way for the Penal Code to uphold 
the death penalty?  
2. Are the provisions on the death penalty within the Penal Code in contradiction with the 
Bill of Rights? 
1.6 Importance of study  
The study seeks to contribute to the literature that proposes the complete abolition of the death 
penalty. In doing so, the study’s perspective will be informed by the method of judicial 
interpretation in Muruatetu.8 As the judgement is recent there is scarcity of published literature 
analysing it. 
1.7 Scope and limitations of the study  
In attempting to make a case for the abolition of the death penalty, the scope of the study shall 
be the consideration of human rights as provided for within Kenya’s bill of rights. 
The study is limited by lack of public access to Kenyan death penalty statistics such as an 
official number of convicts sentenced to death. The study must rely on data obtained from 
human rights commissions and other institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission (CCPR).  
The second limitation is the scarcity of literature on the death penalty in Kenya. 
1.8 Definition of terms  
Death Row Syndrome 
                                                          
8 Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic (2017) eKLR. 
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Convicts who have been sentenced to death and are awaiting execution are known as “being 
on death row”. Part of the death row phenomenon is the stigma and uncertainty of one’s 
execution date. The psychological effects of these bleak living conditions result in “death row 
syndrome.9” 
The death row syndrome was recognised in Godfrey Mutiso v Republic (Mutiso)10.  In reaction 
to the public outcry about the death row syndrome, the President Mwai Kibaki authorised a 
mass commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment in 2009. He stated that the wait for 
execution caused convicts to suffer “undue mental anguish”11.  
De Facto Abolitionist State 
States fall under four categories for the status of the death penalty: retentionists, abolitionists 
for ordinary offences, complete abolitionists and de facto abolitionists.12 Retentionist states 
retain the death penalty in law and practice by executing death row convicts. Abolitionists for 
ordinary offences, retain the death penalty for crimes considered ‘most serious’. Complete 
abolitionists legally and practically abolish the death penalty for all crimes.  
De facto abolitionists retain the death penalty legally but do not apply it. While there is no 
standard classification for what constitutes practicing the penalty, some institutions use a ten-
year limit as a test13. Based on this test, Kenya is de facto abolitionist because no executions 
have occurred in the past 31 years.  
1.9 Outline of the dissertation and its flow of argument  
The dissertation is both a case analysis and a constitutional review. First, the study determines 
the method of constitutional interpretation used by the Supreme Court in Muruatetu. Then the 
study applies this method to article 26 (3) of the constitution to resolve the ambiguity of the 
                                                          
9 —<https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row> on 29 January 2018. 
10 (2010) eKLR, para 16. 
11 ‘Kenya death inmates to serve life’ Daily Nation, 3 August 2009, —< https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-
634012-jn68qoz/index.html> on 21 February 2018. 
12 Amnesty International, Abolitionist and retentionist countries as of march 2018, 1 —
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/6665/2017/en/>, on 8 March 2018. 
13 Amnesty International, Abolitionist and retentionist countries as of march 2018, 1 —




law on the death penalty. The main argument is that a contextual reading of the constitution 
leads to the conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional. Recommendations are made 
based on the results of the research; the harmonization of the penal system and the constitution 






















2.0 Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Methodology   
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework used to challenge and extend the knowledge 
informing the general acceptance that the death penalty is a constitutional limitation of the right 
to life provided for under article 26(3).   
The theories used are contextualism and constitutionalism. The criteria was based on the 
theories which most satisfactorily support the following positions: 
1. The position that although the ambiguity of article 26(3) allows the Penal Code to 
uphold the death penalty, it is not a legitimate limitation on the right to life as it can be 
proven to be antithetical to the constitution.   
2. The position that there must be expedient legal remedies when a law is contrary to the 
constitution: 
a. The significance of harmonization of the constitution and its values with other legal 
statutes.  
b. The significance of the Bill of Rights in the constitution. 
2.1 Contextualism 
Contextualism is the philosophy and technique of “constitutional interpretation in which there 
is a blend of factual and normative considerations taken into account while interpreting the 
constitution.”14  
Contextualism involves understanding the constitution based on factors like the context of the 
dispute, constitutional values, a contemporary sense of justice and subjective rights, morality, 
norms regarding institutional relationships, and most essentially the practical efficacy of 
constitutional provisions in the present context.15  In Muruatetu, the main issue was the 
mandatory death sentence for murder.16 The court relied on constitutional provisions, national 
and international case law, a resolution of the CCPR and articles of the International Covenant 
                                                          
14 Khatiwada A, ‘Interpreting the Constitution: The Formalism and Contextualism Debate’ 2(1) National Judicial 
Academy Law Journal, 2008, 40. 
15 Khatiwada A, ‘Interpreting the Constitution’, 40. 
16 Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic (2017) eKLR, para 27. 
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on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Muruatetu serves as a model for the appropriate method 
of judicial interpretation used in this study. 
The main critique of contextualism has to be addressed as this study attempts to establish the 
death penalty as unconstitutional using contextualism.  
2.1.1 Judicial Activism as a critique of Contextualism 
Contextualism is critiqued for enabling judicial activism. Judicial activism is a "philosophy of 
judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, 
among other factors, to guide their decisions, usually with the suggestion that adherents of this 
philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore precedent.”17 
Within the Kenyan context this risk was enunciated in Joseph Njuguna Mwaura and two 
others v Republic (Mwaura). In Mwaura, the appellants were convicted of two counts of 
robbery with violence and sentenced to death according to section 296 (2) of the Penal Code18. 
They appealed to the High Court which upheld the convictions and affirmed the sentences19. 
The matter was taken before the Court of Appeal where the issue of the constitutionality of the 
sentence was raised.20 
Section 296 (2) provides for a mandatory death sentence for robbery with violence. At the 
Court of Appeal, the counsel for the appellants argued that “as a result of our new, more 
progressive Constitution, courts in this country no longer have the power to sentence convicts 
to death; that the sentence of death is now unlawful, first because it is a violation on the right 
to life, and secondly because it amounts to cruel and inhuman treatment.”21 
The court disagreed and held that the constitution, clearly envisioned the right to life as not 
absolute: 
                                                          
17 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed, 2473. 
18 Republic v Joseph Njuguna Mwaura & 2 others (2004), Thika Law Courts. 
19 Joseph Njuguna Mwaura & 2 others v Republic (2008) eKLR. 
20 Joseph Njuguna Mwaura & 2 others v Republic (2013) eKLR. 
21 Joseph Njuguna Mwaura & 2 others v Republic (2013) eKLR, para. 42. 
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“To suggest that the Articles of the Constitution outlaw the death penalty is, with respect, a 
great danger to the people of Kenya and that is a remarkable departure from the tenets of 
constitutional interpretation.”22 
The Mwaura principle asserts that the court cannot infringe on the powers of the legislature 
and there is a thin line between interpreting and making law. Those who walk that line are 
judicial activists.  
This study proposes a similar argument to that of the appellants’ counsel in Mwaura. Article 
259 (1) of the 2010 constitution counters the Court of Appeal’s position on constitutional 
interpretation. It provides that the constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that promotes 
its purposes, values and principles; advances the human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the Bill of Rights; the development of the law; and contributes to good governance. Article 259 
(3) states: “every provision of this Constitution shall be construed according to the doctrine of 
interpretation that the law is always speaking.” Therefore, the position that the constitution 
outlaws the death penalty, is not a departure from the tenets of constitutional interpretation as 
Mwaura maintains.  
In addition, article 20 (3) (b) provides that in applying a bill of rights’ provision, a court shall 
adopt the interpretation most favorable for enforcement of the right. In response to the Mwaura 
principle, the Supreme Court in Muruatetu affirmed and greatly emphasised the statement by 
the Court of Appeal in Mutiso at paragraph 14 that: 
“(…) human society is constantly evolving and therefore the law, which all civilized societies 
must live under, must evolve in tandem.  A law that is caught up in a time warp would soon 
find itself irrelevant and would be swept into the dustbins of history.”23  
The Supreme Court relies on contextualism and in this way, the court reached the conclusion 
that mandatory death sentencing is unconstitutional and section 204 of the Penal Code is not 
valid. 
                                                          
22 Joseph Njuguna Mwaura & 2 others v Republic (2013) eKLR, para. 55.  
23 Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic (2017) eKLR para. 68. 
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2.1.2 Applicability of other theories of judicial interpretation 
The current interpretation that has upheld the validity of the death penalty is what some would 
call formalism. Formalism is a theory of judicial interpretation claiming that due to legal 
principles adjudication is autonomous from ‘non-legal normative considerations of morality or 
politics’.24 Textualism falls under the umbrella of formalism25. Textualism is the theory of 
interpretation of the law primarily based on interpreting a document or statute, especially one 
involving penal sanctions, according to the ordinary or literal meaning of the text, without 
looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning.26 
Using textualism, the provision in article 26 (3) is straightforward. Life is limited “to the extent 
authorised by this Constitution or other written law.” The Penal Code serves as “other written 
law” and expressly provides for the death penalty. Therefore, the death penalty is legitimate 
and concurs with the stance held in Mwaura.   
Contextualism and textualism are complementary to some extent. Contextualism integrates 
aspects of different theories beginning with textualism, then making other considerations. The 
language of article 26 (3) provides that the limitation on the right to life is also hinged on 
authorisation by the constitution. The textual meaning is that if there is no express authorisation 
of the death penalty by the constitution, the legitimacy of the death penalty can be authorised 
by other written law. Using contextualism, this study comes in to clarify the first part on what 
authorisation by the constitution means. It would seem, that based upon the Bill of Rights there 
is no room for authorisation of the death penalty by the constitution. This implies a 
contradiction between the constitution and the penal code created by the provision of the text 
of article 26 (3) on authorisation by both instruments.  
Formalism cannot direct judges sufficiently in all constitutional cases. This is because value-
neutral interpretations cannot address instances where textual justifications of incoherent laws 
are used to interfere with a fundamental right of people.27Contextualism is the most appropriate 
                                                          
24 Leiter B, ‘Legal formalism and legal realism: what is the issue?’ 16(2), Legal Theory Journal, 2010, 111. 
25 Khatiwada A, ‘Interpreting the Constitution’, 5. 
26 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed, 4458. 
27 Khatiwada A, ‘Interpreting the Constitution’, 40. 
10 
 
method because it requires an examination of what precedes and follows article 26 (3) as well 
as a dependence on constitutional values.  
2.2 Constitutionalism 
Constitutionalism speaks to the entire juridical and legal order of a nation. A government is 
only constitutional if it lives by the spirit of its constitution.28 Constitutionalism promotes the 
embodiment of constitutional principles procedurally and substantively.29 
The spirit of the constitution is identified by its values. Kenya’s national values include human 
dignity and human rights.30 The constitution is the supreme law and the government should not 
abide the death penalty which contradicts constitutional values.  
The assertions in Mwaura on judicial interpretation are contestable. However, this study 
concurs with the Mwaura principle holding that “laws are made by Parliament, not by the 
Court. The Court cannot purport to be ahead of Parliament. Parliament enacts laws and the 
court interprets those laws when made.”31 There must be checks and balances for each function 
of a constitutional government. Respecting constitutionalism facilitates a de jure abolition of 
the death penalty through parliament’s amendment of the Penal Code32. 
2.2.1 Human Rights as an element of Constitutionalism 
Human rights are natural entitlements due to humans by virtue of them being human33. The 
human rights movement stemmed from natural rights and evolved drastically during the 
Enlightenment Period. Natural entitlements are universal and inalienable. Any laws repealing 
                                                          
28 Lumumba PLO and Franceschi L, The constitution of Kenya 2010: An introductory commentary, Strathmore 
University Press, Nairobi, 2014, 3. 
29 Lumumba PLO and Franceschi L, The constitution of Kenya 2010, 4.  
30 Article 10 (2) (b), Constitution of Kenya (2010).  
31 Franceschi L,‘The supreme court almost killed the death penalty’ Daily Nation, 15 December 2017—< 
https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/blogs/dot9/franceschi/2274464-4229722-qalmy3/index.html> on 31 January 
2018. 
32 Lumumba PLO and Franceschi L, The constitution of Kenya 2010, 155. 
33 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya: Principles, government and human rights, 
LawAfrica Publishing, Nairobi, 2014, 155. 
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them would be unjust34. In contrast, legal rights are those entitlements bestowed on a person 
by a legal system and can be limited or repealed.  
In the 20th century, natural rights were codified into soft law, in reaction to slavery, war crimes 
and other forms of human exploitation. Human rights are a precondition for the possibility of 
a justly organised society”.35 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) recognizes that human rights are “equal and inalienable” rights acknowledged to “all 
members of the human family”.36  
The human rights theory is relevant to the death penalty debate because both arguments for and 
against it revolve around different conceptions of the right to life. Kenya’s conception of human 
rights aligns with the position that rights accrue to human beings naturally.37 Article 19(3) (a) 
of the 2010 Constitution provides that rights “belong to each individual and are not granted by 
the State”. Kenya’s constitution has an extensive Bill of Rights different from the last which 
was full of limitations via claw-back clauses.38 These clauses defeated the purpose of 
guaranteeing the rights by frustrating their facilitation39. The claw-back clauses informed the 
judiciary’s restrictive treatment of human rights litigation and constitutional interpretation40. 
Evidenced by the discussions on contextualism and constitutionalism, a restrictive approach to 
the Bill of Rights is not a proper approach to constitutional interpretation.  
Along with the 2010 constitution’s Bill of Rights, Kenya established specialized bodies such 
as the Commission on Administrative Justice and a Human Rights Commission (KHRC) to 
protect, promote and enforce human rights.41 The KHRC has conducted research studies aimed 
at abolition of the death penalty and acted as amicus curiae in Muruatetu. 
                                                          
34 Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologiae’ Prima Secundae, Part I-II q95, a 2 —
<http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2095.htm> on 8 March 2018.  
35 Burns H. Weston, ‘Human rights’, 20 March 2014, Encyclopaedia Britannica, —
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-rights> on 21 February 2018.  
36 UNGA, The universal declaration of human rights, UN A/Res/217/(III), 10 December 1948. 
37 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya, 155. 
38 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya, 156. 
39 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya, 156. 
40 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya, 156. 
41 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya, 212. 
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Basing this study’s theoretical framework on such a conception of human rights justifies the 
arguments made for the abolition of the death penalty. Notably, Kenya is a signatory to 
international human rights conventions and has obligations under them and customary 
international law. Accordingly, death penalty positions asserted within international law, for 
example, provisions of UDHR are relied on as persuasive authorities. 
2.3 Research methodology 
This is a doctrinal research study involving qualitative analysis. Doctrinal research aims at 
systematizing, rectifying and clarifying a legal question by an analysis of authoritative texts 
that consists of primary and secondary sources42. The study reviews the constitution, the penal 
code and case law as primary sources. From the case law, Muruatetu was appropriately chosen 
to model the theoretical framework because it is a decision of the Supreme Court and it 
confirmed the use of contextualism for constitutional interpretation. 
The study’s secondary sources are also doctrinal research and are analysed to systematize the 
legal development of the death penalty in Kenya. Relevant books, journals, human rights 
commissions’ reports and articles which support arguments for and against the abolition of the 
death penalty in Kenya are reviewed based on the theoretical framework; an interpretive 
approach that considers the subjective meanings and context of the sources. Deductive 
reasoning is applied as a technique of qualitative analysis.43 
The qualitative analysis or value-based judgement is necessary to determine which of the two 
diverging interpretations of article 26 (3) is fitting. Textually interpreted the constitution gives 
room for the Penal Code to uphold the death penalty. Contextually, it could lead to the 
conclusion that the constitution does not authorize the death penalty. Analysis of the 
application of article 26(3) was achieved using the theories of contextualism, constitutionalism 
and the perspective of human rights.  
This study focuses on the human rights perspective because the death penalty is a human rights 
issue. Using this perspective, the study hinges on a critical analysis of the bill of rights within 
                                                          
42 —
<http://epgp.inflibnet.ac.in/epgpdata/uploads/epgp_content/law/09._research_methodology/06._research_design
/et/8152_et_et.pdf> on 2 March 2018. 
43 Chynoweth P, ‘Legal Research’ in Knight A and Ruddock L (eds) 1st ed Advanced research methods in the 
built environment, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2008, 32. 
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the constitution. The constitution is an appropriate authority because it is the supreme law of 
Kenya. The analysis of the three different areas using deductive reasoning provided answers to 
the research questions. 
The methodology suits the time and resource limits of this study because only desk top research 
and not field research is used to address the research problem. The methodology relied greatly 
on analysis of laws and literature so it was limited by the scarcity of secondary sources dealing 




















3.0 Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.1 Primary Sources 
Besides the constitution, Kenyan case law was considered in answering the research questions 
because the courts have investigated both the issue of  the phrasing of article 26 (3) and the 
phrasing of the death penalty provisions in the penal code, together with their alignment to the 
bill of rights.  
Different positions on the death penalty have been taken in Kenyan case law, informed by 
factors like foreign case law and Kenya’s international obligations. A review of these primary 
sources entails a description of the legal history of the death penalty in post-independent Kenya.  
3.1.1 Legal history of the death penalty post-independence 
In 1963 the death penalty was provided for under article 71 (1) of the constitution which stated 
that “no person shall be deprived of his life intentionally, save in execution of the sentence of 
a court in respect of a criminal offence under the law of Kenya of which he has been 
convicted”.44 While the intention of the provision is to uphold the right to life, it provides in 
clear terms an endorsement for the death penalty.  
Since its inception, the penal code has prescribed a mandatory imposition of the death penalty 
for the following crimes:  
a. Murder under section 204 
b. Treason under section 40 
c. Robbery with violence under section 296 (2) 
d. Attempted robbery under section 297 (2) 
e. Administration of unlawful oaths to commit capital offences under section 60. 
In 2003, the president of the country commuted death row convicts to life imprisonment45. At 
the time, there was pressure from civil societies and support for abolition by personalities such 
                                                          
44 Article 71(1), Constitution of Kenya (1963). 
45 Namyalo D and Macalesher J, ‘The abolition of the death penalty and its alternative sanction in East Africa: 
Kenya and Uganda’ Penal Reform International, Research Paper, 2012, 8 —https://www.penalreform.org/wp-





as the vice-president, the minister of justice and constitutional affairs and the commissioner of 
prisons.46 
In 2007, there was a motion to abolish the death penalty in Parliament because of the large 
number of inmates languishing on death row.47 The motion failed because majority of the 
members of parliament and the public in general were still in support of the death penalty.48 
The main reason for this was the fear that abolition would be a catalyst for the commission of 
more capital offences at a time when Kenya was dealing with a security threat in the form of 
the organization called ‘Mungiki’.49 The justice and constitutional affairs minister said the issue 
would be comprehensively debated during the constitutional review to be held after the 
elections.50 In the same year, Kenya abstained on a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
resolution calling for a global moratorium on executions which passed by a majority of 104 to 
54, with 29 abstentions.51  
In 2009, Mwai Kibaki issued the largest commutation of convicts yet in reaction to the 
discourse on the death row syndrome.52 Around 4000 death row convicts had their sentences 
commuted to life imprisonment.53  
In the case of Godfrey Ngotho Mutiso v Republic (Mutiso) the Court of Appeal found 
mandatory death sentencing for the crime of murder to be unconstitutional, because it 
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constituted cruel and inhumane treatment, and violated the right to fair trial.54 Moreover, the 
court mentioned that their findings could be applied to other capital offences stating that while, 
it could not make a conclusive determination on the other capital, there is doubt that different 
arguments could be raised in respect of these offenses55.  
In the same year as the Mutiso judgement a new constitution was promulgated. The provision 
on the right to life was amended. Article 26(3) of the constitution states: “A person shall not 
be deprived of life intentionally, except to the extent authorised by this Constitution or other 
written law”. This provision differs from article 71 (1) of the 1963 constitution because it makes 
no mention of the state imposing a death sentence in respect to criminal offences. It seems to 
be progressing towards the abolition of the death penalty but does not outwardly delegitimize 
it.  
Kenya abstained from voting in the 2010 UNGA resolution on a death penalty moratorium 
with a view to abolition56. This is Kenya’s third abstention from a UNGA resolution concerning 
the death penalty. Despite the abstention, there is a de facto moratorium on the execution of 
the death penalty.57 Kenya notified the United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC) that 
the existing de facto moratorium in place since 1987, would remain.58 
This de facto moratorium contradicts Kenya’s position because it does not impact the legality 
of it or stop courts from meting it out. Kenya’s moratorium on executions is not presented as 
official government policy but the personal inclination of the incumbent president not to sign 
execution warrants and to commute death sentences.59 Technically, execution of the death 
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penalty could be resumed any time. This situation demands clarity at least in relation to the 
right to life.  
In 2013, the Court of Appeal in Mwaura gave a decision that was in conflict with its judgement 
in Mutiso. It provided that section 204 of the penal code was not discretionary. The use of the 
term “shall” left the court with no alternative but to impose the death penalty, because the term 
bestows a mandatory obligation. The court stated: “We hold that the decision in Godfrey Mutiso 
v R to be per incuriam in so far as it purports to grant discretion in sentencing with regard to 
capital offences.”   
This decision affected the treatment of mandatory death sentencing in the lower courts. An 
example of this is the Republic v Abduba Guyo Wada case which spoke against the rationale 
used in Mwaura, but had to uphold stare decisis.60 Other cases followed suit by deferring to 
stare decisis, and applying the mandatory death sentencing, provided for within the penal code 
including Jackson Maina Wangui & another v Republic and Republic v Thomas Kipkemoi 
Kipkorir & 2 others.61 
In 2017, the Muruatetu decision of the Supreme Court, declared the mandatory nature of the 
death sentence under Section 204 of the penal code unconstitutional. This decision is binding 
on all other courts. It is an assumption of the study that the rationale used in Muruatetu can be 
applied by the lower courts, not only to the offence of murder but to all other capital offences. 
Effectively, Muruatetu delegitimizes the mandatory imposition of the death sentence.  
Based on this history, the study’s objective is an attempt to prove that interpreting the 
constitution contextually as in Muruatetu will lead to the conclusion that the death penalty 
should be abolished.  
3.2 Secondary Sources 
To answer the research questions, this study reviewed literature on the constitutionality of the 
death penalty in Kenya and the human rights perspective on the death penalty. 
3.2.1 On the ambiguity of article 26 (3)  
While this research question was mainly addressed through analysis of the primary sources, 
some secondary sources are referred to. This is because the main issue is the determination of 
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an appropriate method of constitutional interpretation. Given the time and the resources limit, 
these sources are relied upon: 
a. Khatiwada A, (2008).62 
b. Novak A, (2011).63 
c. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR) Study on the question 
of the death penalty in Africa (2012).64 
d. Lumumba PLO and Franceschi L, (2010).65  
Khatiwada makes a case for contextualism as preferable to formalism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation. The article describes the various methods of judicial 
interpretation, including textualism. He proposes that judicial interpretation must be value-
based in order to promote the protection of fundamental rights of people66. The article supports 
this study’s use of contextualism as a theoretical framework to explain how the constitution 
can be construed as antithetical to the death penalty.  
Novak discusses the constitutional challenges brought against the death penalty worldwide. He 
highlights the trend toward abolition of the death penalty.67 The history of the death penalty in 
Kenya as well as its current use is analysed. Novak discusses Mutiso in which mandatory death 
sentencing for the crime of murder was declared unconstitutional68. He highlights the social 
context in which the 2010 constitution was drafted and possible reasons why the death penalty 
was not expressly abolished at that juncture; there were more controversial issues that took the 
spotlight including the questions of abortion and Kadhi’s courts.69 
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One of the opposing arguments on death penalty abolition is that of public opinion. Novak 
recognizes public opinion as a reason the death penalty was not abolished.70 Death penalty 
retentionists rely on public opinion in relation to constitutionalism and constitutional values. 
They maintain that all sovereign power belongs to the people and is to be exercised according 
to the constitution.71 The Kenyan constitution provides that democracy is a national value.72 
Therefore, a state that respects the sovereignty of its people and upholds democracy cannot 
ignore their wishes. 
However, Lumumba’s book informed this study’s conception of constitutionalism, providing 
a definition and listing the characteristics of a constitutional government based on 
constitutional values and principles.  The public opinion argument is countered using 
Lumumba and a study by ACmHPR.73 The study lays out paternalistic rebuttals by 
abolitionists. It states that a key responsibility of a democratic state is to lead and educate its 
people.74  
The Commission’s study describes a number of issues with the death penalty, they include: the 
death penalty is cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment because of the death row syndrome; 
and in the case of error when carrying out an execution or where the execution is a gruesome 
public display, it is traumatizing on prison staff and the executor and the death penalty system 
is more expensive than an alternative system in which the maximum sentence is life 
imprisonment.75 Where a state is aware of all these factors, it would seem that they would be 
justified in acting against public opinion where it is in the best interests of the public.  
Novak opines that in Kenya, the use of the mandatory death penalty for crimes other than 
murder has been a means by which political opponents have been targeted by the government.76 
This provides the study with insight on some of the effects of the uncertain formulation of 
article 26 (3). 
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3.2.2 On the death penalty within the Penal Code from the perspective of the Bill of Rights 
Addressing this research question required reliance primarily on:  
a. Novak A, (2011).77  
b. Chenwi L, (2007).78  
c. Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, (2014).79 
Ambani’s book was relied on to conceptualise human rights within the Kenyan context. He 
defines human rights and describes their inherent nature. He also discusses the importance of 
a bill of rights and connects it to the reason why there was a need for constitutional review of 
the 1963 Kenyan constitution.80  
According to Novak, Mutiso was at the time the leading case on a constitutional challenge of 
the death penalty. He discussed the three constitutional provisions examined in the case. 
provisions were on the right to life, the right to be free from cruel, inhumane, or degrading 
treatment or punishment, and the right to a fair trial. 
On the other hand, Chenwi writes broadly on the ways in which the death penalty’s operation 
in Africa conflicts with human rights. She delves into the qualified and unqualified nature of 
the right to life provided for under the constitutions of African State.81 Chenwi concludes that 
it is proper for African states to join the international trend for death penalty abolition because 
it conflicts with human rights, its retentionist justifications are fundamentally flawed, and there 
are alternatives to the death penalty which can be implemented in Africa.  
This position clarifies the research problem and addresses the first research question by 
emphasizing the importance of phrasing: it states that it is the formulation of the right to life in 
constitutions that obstructs the abolition of the death penalty.82 While the author has not 
examined the Kenyan constitution specifically the insight provided by her general analysis of 
                                                          
77 Novak A, ‘Constitutional reform and abolition of the death penalty in Kenya’. 
78 Chenwi L, Towards the abolition of the death penalty in Africa; A human rights perspective, Pretoria University 
Law Press, Pretoria, 2007. 
79 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya. 
80 Mbondenyi MK and Ambani J, The new constitutional law of Kenya, 155-160.  
81 Chenwi L, Towards the abolition of the death penalty in Africa, 74. 
82 Chenwi L, Towards the abolition of the death penalty in Africa, 77. 
21 
 
constitutions with limited and absolute provisions on the right to life is helpful. Her book is 
relevant to the theoretical framework because of her detailed addresses of: the right to life, right 
to a fair trial and the prohibition of cruel degrading and inhumane treatment.  
The literature examined is in agreement on the status of Kenya as a de facto abolitionist state. 
There is also general consensus on the fact that the current operation of the death penalty in 
Kenya leads to the death row syndrome. The position that the death penalty is a human rights 
issue and can be constitutionally challenged is popular as the human rights reports have shown. 
However, scientific publications on the death penalty in Africa and Kenya are scarce. Most of 
the literature on the death penalty in Kenya is focused on the abolition of the mandatory 
imposition of the death penalty rather than the abolition of the penalty itself. 
In the following chapter the Kenyan bill of rights shall be examined in greater detail to 

















4.0 Chapter Four: Understanding the death penalty in light of the bill of 
rights 
In determining the constitutionality of the mandatory nature of the death penalty, the Supreme 
Court stated “it is imperative to consider certain constitutional provisions in relation to the 
above”.83Using the same method, this study shall analyze the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in the logic of the bill of rights. While the right to life is central to the discussion, other 
constitutional rights will be examined in so far as they contribute to the death penalty debate.  
4.1 The Right to Life under article 26 (3)84  
The right to life recognises that a human being is entitled to live and particularly, not be killed 
by another human being. In Kenya, life begins at conception.85 Once a human being is 
conceived, the state has an obligation to protect and promote their enjoyment of the right to 
life.  
Like Chenwi, the ACmHPR’s study on the death penalty states the right to life is a cardinal 
human right.86 The commission and the author agree that the death penalty is incompatible with 
the right to life as provided in article 3 of the UDHR.87 Chenwi states: “I am of the view that 
the application of the death penalty in Africa is, therefore, a violation of the right to life 
guaranteed under article 3 of the UDHR, which is binding on states as it constitutes customary 
international law.”88 The CCPR takes the definitive view that the right to life is supreme and 
cannot be derogated from even in times of public emergency.89  
While the international consensus is that the right to life is a fundamental right, this does not 
mean that fundamental rights are universally absolute90. The right to life in Kenya is a qualified 
right as opposed to absolute.91 The debate is on whether the right to life ought to be recognized 
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as non-derogable. Muruatetu makes reference to the CCPR’s assertion of the right to life as the 
most fundamental.92 
This study hypothesizes that if the issue was examined in detail, it would find the right to life 
should have been provided for in the constitution without any limiting terms. The study 
examines the death penalty based on the fact that article 26 (3) does not provide for an absolute 
right to life which makes it difficult to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty.93  
The right to life can be qualified in two ways: by stating it may not be deprived arbitrarily or 
by stating that one can be deprived of life in execution of a sentence of a court.94 This study 
does not consider article 26 (3) to be a clearly defined qualification, when compared to other 
constitutional provisions on the right to life in countries such as Nigeria, which utilize a savings 
clause similar to the one in the 1963 Kenyan constitution. The main difference between the two 
qualified provisions, article 71 and article 26 (3) is that the latter allows for a constitutional 
challenge of the death penalty that depends on the court’ interpretation of the provision.95 
The 1963 constitution envisioned instances where the right to life could be limited. It provided 
for circumstances such as defence from violence, defence of property, effecting a lawful arrest, 
suppressing riots and, in the prevention of a criminal offence.96 
Using the examples provided by article 71 (2), it is true that there could be, implied under 
article 26(3), reasonable limitations on the right to life. Self-defence can be one of them because 
the right to life cannot realistically admit to having no qualifications whatsoever.97 However, 
this study concerns itself with state-sanctioned limitations on the right to life, specifically the 
death penalty.  
In S v Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court stated that the right to life includes the right of 
every person not to be deliberately killed by the State through a systematically planned act of 
execution as a mode of punishment.98 It differentiated between the death penalty and self-
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defence by saying: “The deliberate annihilation of the life of a person, systematically planned 
by the State as a mode of punishment, is wholly and qualitatively different. It is not like the act 
of killing in self-defence, an act justifiable in the defence of the clear right of the victim to the 
preservation of his life. It is not performed in a state of sudden emergency, or under the 
extraordinary pressures which operate when insurrections are confronted or when the State 
defends itself during war”.99 The case rationale proposes that taking a life in self defence is 
justifiable but the state taking a life as punishment is not.  
Limiting the state’s power to repeal the right to life, be it through shoot to kill orders or the 
death penalty, is an objective of constitutionalism. Notably the provisions of the bill of rights 
are binding on all law and state organs.100 Despite the formulation of article 26 (3), article 20 
provides that everyone shall enjoy a right to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of 
that right101. The nature of the right to life shall be discussed in the examination of the 
provisions on the limitation of rights. 
4.2 Limitation of rights and fundamental freedoms under article 24102 
Since the right to life is limited it is important to examine the constitutional provisions on the 
limitations of rights under Article 24 (1) which states: 
“A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and 
then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including- 
a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any 
individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and 
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e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose”. 
The primacy of the right to life is that it enables the enjoyment of other rights. This quality 
amplifies the severity of the death penalty as a mode of punishment. The importance of the 
death penalty’s purpose can be gauged by questioning whether it meets the goals of 
punishment. According to the 2016 Judiciary of Kenya Sentencing Policy Guidelines 
referenced in Muruatetu, sentences are imposed to meet the objectives of retribution, 
deterrence both general and specific, rehabilitation, restorative justice, community protection 
and denunciation.103  
Proponents of the death penalty argue that it is effective as retribution and for specific 
deterrence, community protection and denunciation.  Specific deterrence is the inhibition of 
the offender’s recidivism. While this study agrees that the death penalty is effective as a specific 
deterrence measure, opponents of the death penalty sustain that this mode of deterrence 
undermines the goals of rehabilitation and restorative justice.  
Furthermore, there is little proof of its efficiency in general deterrence. General deterrence is 
the discouragement of the public from committing similar offences. A comparison between 
retentionists and abolitionist states suggests little correlation between capital punishment and 
the number of capital offences committed.104 
The death penalty in Kenya serves as a poorer deterrent because it is not being utilized fully: it 
has not been effected since 1987.105 More death row convicts have had their terms commuted 
to life imprisonment than have been executed.106The best deterrents are punishments which are 
sure and quick, unlike spending years on death row.107  
The provision in article 24 (1) (d) on the need to ensure one’s right to life does not prejudice 
the rights of others can be considered together with article 24 (1) (e). Article 24 (1) (e) provides 
                                                          
103 Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic (2017) eKLR, para. 92. 
104 ACmHPR Study on the question of the death penalty in Africa, 39. 
105 UN Committee against Torture Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kenya, adopted by 
the Committee at its fiftieth session (6 to 31 May 2013), 19 June 2013, CAT/C/KEN/CO/2, 11. 
106 Robert Oduol, G21 Africa Capital Punishment: Texas to Kenya, 12 September 2005, —
<http://archive.li/yRpB3> on 27 February 2018. 
107 ACmHPR Study on the question of the death penalty in Africa, 38. 
26 
 
for the relation between the death penalty’s purpose and whether there are less restrictive means 
to achieve the purpose. Allowing for the continued existence of the offender may prejudice the 
rights and freedoms of others. However, the right to life of a person who has committed a 
capital offence is equal to that of any other citizen. The finality of the death penalty makes it 
more important to investigate alternative means of effecting punishment.  
This study agrees with the Supreme Court in Muruatetu that the death penalty is an exceptional 
form of punishment.108 The right to life if limited should be limited in the same manner as other 
rights. For example, when freedom of movement is limited by a curfew during a state of 
emergency, it is not an absolute limitation. The limitation is location and time specific and the 
freedom can be restored after a change of circumstances. The death penalty leaves no room for 
any manner of enjoyment of the right to life when executed: it is irreversible and irrevocable.109 
Life imprisonment could be a less restrictive means of effecting the goals of punishment. 
Opponents of this stance raise the theory of proportionality as an issue. Proportionality 
maintains that the punishment should fit the crime, which means the death penalty should be 
reserved for the most serious crimes of which the offenders are effectively culpable. The 
National Constitutional Conference (NCC) relied on proportionality when they removed the 
express provision abolishing the death penalty from the Bomas Draft stating: “people who 
commit heinous crimes should be punished as harshly as possible”.110  
The internationally recognized crimes considered most serious include crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes. The national system should treat their most serious crimes 
with the same respect for human rights as the international system treats theirs. For grave 
crimes, the greatest penalties that have been imposed by the International Criminal Court, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia are variations on life imprisonment.111   
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Life imprisonment is a less restrictive means of achieving the goals of punishment. It is more 
congruent with human rights than the death penalty. Therefore, when the NCC prescribed the 
harshest punishment possible, the death penalty should not have been envisioned as a 
possibility.  
4.3 The death penalty and article 28 on human dignity 
Human dignity is a foundational value for any bill of rights as well as a right. Indeed, article 
28 of the constitution provides: 
“Every person has inherent dignity and the right to have that dignity respected and protected.”  
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) is convinced that “abolition of 
the death penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive 
development of human rights”.112 Article 19 (2) provides that the purpose of recognizing and 
protecting human rights is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities.113 Logically, 
if all due respect was accorded to human dignity, there could be no justification for the denial 
of the right to life of convicts, even in denunciation and retribution-centered justice systems.114 
This is based on the reasoning that human beings cannot be treated as a means to an end or an 
‘article of crime prevention’.115 The act of taking a human life to achieve a set of goals is 
degrading to human dignity, more so when the death penalty is not an efficient means of 
achieving most goals of punishment. 
The concept of human dignity in relation to the death penalty is tied to other provisions within 
the bill of rights including access to justice and freedom and security of the person under which 
the freedom from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment is provided. 
Muruatetu abolished the mandatory death penalty in deference to the right of access to justice 
and the right to fair trial. Even with a discretionary death penalty that allows for appeal, there 
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is always the risk of erroneous conviction. Respect of fair trial rights and due process mitigates 
this risk. However, the only guarantee to prevent the death of innocents and uphold the integrity 
of the right to life is abolition of the death penalty. 
Ignoring the possibility of erroneous convictions, death row convicts suffer numerous 
violations of their dignity within the penal system. Kenyan courts legally continue to pass death 
sentences but executions are not carried out. Notwithstanding commutation of death sentences, 
this leads to a situation whereby the number of death row convicts keeps increasing without a 
corresponding increase or improvement in holding facilities and conditions.116 Prisons in 
Kenya are challenged by severe overcrowding.117 Due to this, the Kenyan prisons service is 
unable to provide adequate living conditions, and access to medical and psychiatric care.118 
This lack is felt more gravely by death row convicts.119  
This situation and the death row syndrome violates personal dignity through the violation of 
freedom and security of the person which provides for freedom from cruel, inhumane or 
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5.0 Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion 
It is about time that Kenya’s de facto abolitionist status shifted to a de jure abolitionist one.  Its 
current status allows for the possibility that the death penalty can be executed in the event of a 
president willing to sign execution warrants.121 
An examination of article 26 (3) showed that technically, its ambiguity does not prevent the 
Penal Code or any other written law to prescribe the death penalty. However as shown, a further 
analysis of the constitution leads to the conclusion that other written law should not prescribe 
rules which are inconsistent with the constitution. The death penalty is antithetical to the 
constitutional provisions and to the spirit of the Constitution.122  Maintaining the irrevocable 
death penalty provisions in the penal code when there are less restrictive limitations is illogical.  
The abolition of mandatory death sentencing does not facilitate access to justice. It does not 
completely erode cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment because it creates a situation that 
exacerbates poor living conditions for death row convicts. All these factors go against human 
dignity, a value that the constitution purposes to promote and protect.  
The abolition of mandatory death sentencing in Muruatetu, signals the potential complete 
abolition of the death penalty. It is this study’s prediction that if a constitutional challenge to 
the death penalty arose, the judiciary would rule in favor of it. It is envisaged that Kenya will 
one day become a de jure abolitionist state. Instead of waiting for a constitutional challenge to 
be brought before the courts via public interest litigation, the study provides recommendations 
towards the move to complete abolition of the death penalty.  
5.2 Recommendations 
As a provisional measure, the government can establish an official moratorium on both 
sentencing offenders to death and execution of the penalty itself. The permanent measures for 
the abolition of the death penalty in Kenyan law would include: 
                                                          
121 ACmHPR Study on the question of the death penalty in Africa, 49. 
122 Godfrey Ngotho Mutiso v Republic, (2010) eKLR, para. 36. 
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5.2.1 Amendment of the Penal Code 
The possibility of parliament should abolish in law the death penalty by eliminating it as a form 
of punishment under section 24 and 25 of the Penal Code Act as well as from the five capital 
offences provisions; sections 40, 60, 204, 296 (2) and 297 (2).  
Abolition of the death penalty through the proposed means would create a need for an 
alternative penalty to replace it.  
The theory that punishments ought to be proportionate to the crime can still be respected even 
with the abolition of the death penalty. Currently the alternative sanction to the death penalty 
in Kenya is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.123 Life imprisonment, can serve 
the purposes of deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation. There has been no proof that the death 
penalty is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment.124 
The challenge of life imprisonment as an alternative sanction in Kenya is the poor living 
conditions in prisons. This study recommends the adoption of a prisons reform strategy, 
through the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, with the mission 
of ensuring that living conditions in prisons are consistent with international human rights 
standards and norms. 
 
5.2.2 Constitutional Amendment   
After the 2010 constitution it was felt by many that the wording of article 26 (3) was 
progressing towards abolition of the death penalty in a very near future. However, this has not 
been the case as eight years later the penalty still exists de jure. 
The provision of article 26(3) is constitutional. The issue is that the constitution does not justify 
the death penalty. If the penal code is not amended, to clarify the matter, it would be best if the 
article 26 expressly abolished the death penalty. The same effect could be achieved if article 
26 was provided for in absolute, non-qualified terms. 
                                                          
123 Namyalo D and Macalesher J, ‘The abolition of the death penalty and its alternative sanction in East Africa: 
Kenya and Uganda’, 6. 




Amendment of the constitution occurs by parliamentary initiative or popular initiative.125 Both 
ways would require the amendment to be approved through national referendum because it 
relates to the bill of rights.126 
 Alternatively, the parliament could make a request/reference to the Office of the Attorney 
General to interpret article 26(3) with the aim of effectively abolishing the death penalty.  
5.2.3 Ratification of International Treaties on the Death Penalty 
If the penal code or constitution is not amended, the Government, through the office of the 
attorney general, should facilitate the signing and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty which would lead the state to 
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